'A Plan of Action' to build an Iranian bomb

Editor's note: The number of pages contained in the recent Iranian nuclear agreement has been changed below.

The "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" between the U.S., European Union, France, Germany, UK, Russia, China and the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a stated purpose to "ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful" will provide Iran with the tools to enable it to transition rapidly to a nuclear weapons program at a time of its choosing.

The 159-page agreement, initialed by the negotiating parties July 14, is a bad deal for the United States, its allies and the world -- at least the nations that prefer to avoid a more powerful Iran, a revived nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and more military conflicts in the region.

The idea of a nuclear deal with Iran has some merit. The U.S. negotiated treaties with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, for example, which reduced nuclear stockpiles, eliminated classes of weapons, and contributed to a more predictable relationship. A realistic approach recognizes we cannot limit our diplomacy to nations with the human rights record of Sweden and the same devotion to the truth as the Dalai Lama.

We have forged alliances, treaties and other understandings with democracies, absolutist states and dictatorships alike, based on mutual self-interest, not identity of values. As much as we disagree with Iran's political system, reject their world view, despise their abuses of their own people and oppose their support for nefarious movements, those reasons should not prevent negotiations, if these discussions are based on Iran's genuine yielding of progress toward nuclear weapons. The U.S. and its allies were in a strong position to force an agreement on Iran, and indeed gave initial indications we would drive a hard line, demanding inspections "anytime, anywhere," for example.

However, this "Plan of Action" not only will not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, it mandates U.S. and European technical assistance toward that goal. The agreement states "Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons." Even in its beginning, the plan is a farce; if Iran was not already well into a nuclear weapons program, there would have been no reason for these negotiations. When the U.S. allows Iran to reaffirm a lie in the preface of an agreement, that signals disaster in the rest of the document.

In a comprehensive deal with Iran, general sanctions on the Iranian economy should end, which this agreement does. What is mind-boggling about this agreement is it also lifts sanctions on Iran's capacity to develop as a nuclear power. The areas that will no longer be subject to limitations include "proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities," a loophole so large a division of Iranian Revolutionary Guards could -- and probably will -- drive right through it.

The U.S. and Europeans are ensuring the near-impossibility of holding Iran accountable even to this weak and counterproductive agreement. The West waives the right to "inspections, seizures and disposal" of contraband cargoes on Iranian shipping, allows Iran to delay by up to 24 days the inspection of any disputed site (thereby granting ample time to move any suspect activities), lifts sanctions on "mining, production or transportation of uranium" and ends bans on Iranian students pursuing advanced scientific degrees in U.S. and European universities in nuclear science and nuclear engineering. The U.S. and Europeans also promise to provide "on-the-job training on (nuclear) fuel management scenarios" and "apprenticeship courses for reactor and facility operators."

If Iran cannot buy all the nuclear fuel, equipment, tools and technology it wants on world markets, just in case some suppliers are reluctant, the U.S. and EU promise to "facilitate Iran's acquisition" of these materials, including through providing financial assistance to "upgrade current systems" to the state of the art. Any dispute over technology or inspections requires agreement by at least five of the eight parties to the agreement. Unless Germany, France, the UK and the European Union agree with the U.S., we can take no action or reimpose sanctions, assuming Russia and China support Iran's protestations of innocence in all matters. U.S. national security should not be left in the hands of whatever government happens to be ruling in Paris, Berlin or Brussels, much less Beijing, Moscow and Tehran.

Most disturbing, Iran's new partners -- including the Obama Administration -- pledge to provide "training courses and workshops" and other unspecified support to enhance the security of nuclear facilities. In other words, if Iran takes advantage of the loopholes in this agreement to develop nuclear weapons, any nation that decides to take military action will face defenses improved by the U.S. and EU, facing greater odds and casualties in any conflict; indeed, this provision increases the need for any attack on Iran to be even more massive and decisive. While American citizens are prohibited from serving as nuclear inspectors, their nation is committed to the defense of the very program they are unable to verify.

Finally, the lifting of nearly all sanctions on the Iranian economy will provide it with hundreds of billions of dollars for use on whatever it deems of national interest. Even putting aside the billions they will no doubt send to terrorist movements, the Assad regime in Syria, and the most anti-American, anti-Israeli and anti-Saudi groups in the world, can any serious observer promise they will not use at least some of this found money to continue with nuclear weapons research and development, in some of the 99 percent of Iran exempted from international inspections?

Wayne Bowen received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University, and also is an Army veteran.