MISSOURI COMMENTARY: DAYTON ENDED BOSNIA I; WHAT STOPS BOSNIA II?

The Clinton administration avoided an internal bloodletting when Richard Holbrooke was not selected as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Holbrooke's first goal was to be named secretary of state, with the U.N. post being something of a consolation prize. Now that he won't get that position either, his legacy for the time being will be the Bosnian cease-fire, but that legacy is a mixed one.

Holbrooke is a bright, experienced, aggressive foreign policy whiz who justifiably is entitled to great praise as principal architect of the 1995 Dayton agreement. That agreement did accomplish its principal initial objectives: stopping the bloodletting in Bosnia and creating the framework for a workable cease-fire.

The rest of the Dayton agreement has not been accomplished. Three of the most intensely negotiated and lauded principles have not been achieved -- and never will.

Bosnia now consists of three ethnically pure regions -- Serb, Croat and Muslim -- that are ethnically pure as pure can be. As far as the Serbs and Croats are concerned, that's the way they want it to remain. The Muslims, deep down, are also not against ethnic purity. They simply want more territory in which to practice it.

Two of Dayton's planks were 1. permit freedom of movement of persons, goods, and services and 2. prevent activities hindering the return of displaced persons.

There is nothing in the Dayton agreement that can force the Serbs to welcome back hundreds of thousands of Muslims to their area. Same for the Croats. There are precious few Serbs and Croats who want to venture into Muslim held territory.

The Clinton administration feels honor bound to espouse the principles as signed in Dayton. Holbrooke especially, as chief architect, wants to stick to what was signed. Reality in Bosnia, however, is something much different.

American, French and British forces will not fight their way into the Serb and Croat sectors as escorts of displaced Muslims. It's not going to happen. For that matter, the Muslims are equally adamant on keeping refugee Serbs and Croats out of territory that they control.

We have a distinct cleavage between the theoretical pronouncements of Dayton and the existing reality on the ground in Bosnia.

Such is the case with another key item in the Dayton agreement: full cooperation with the U.N. War Crimes Tribunal, meaning going into Serb territory and capturing the star thugs Radovan Karadzk and Ratko Mladic.

From the start, this has been an embarrassing item for the United States. The allied military commanders in Bosnia have made it clear that they want no part in armed encounters seeking to capture high-ranking war criminals. Both have been spotted by allied military personnel -- but both are heavily protected and could not be apprehended without a shootout, the consequences of which would endanger the cease-fire.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense William Perry have been repeatedly asked about what's being done to capture Karadzic and Mladic. Christopher and Perry stutter around the talk in circles leaving the impression that if war criminals more or less surrendered themselves we might consider taking them into custody -- but only then. Once again, another disparity from Dayton theory and contemporary reality.

All of this speak-one-thing-and-do-another pretense would have been very difficult for Holbrooke to pull off in the limelight of the U.N. Holbrooke believed that it was possible over time to have a central Bosnia government with two sub-states, one Muslim-Croat and on Serb. Nice notion. It wasn't and isn't going to happen. The three parts of Bosnia are separate and will so remain.

Sometime into the new Clinton term, there will have to be a recognition of the realities in Bosnia. It isn't so difficult for Washington to shift from the surreal to the real. But how to persuade the Bosnia Muslims? They were the war victims. They have the preponderance of refugees. The Muslim held territory is so small as to be of dubious viability as a functioning state.

Americans are training and equipping the Muslim forces so that they could better defend themselves against a future Serb attack. Indeed, they are now better trained and better armed than they were at anytime during the war. What happens when the international forces are ultimately withdrawn? If the ultimate objectives of Dayton fail? do the Muslims militarily seek to do for themselves what the peace negotiators were unable to achieve? We resolved Bosnia I at Dayton, but that doesn't guarantee against a Bosnia II.

~Tom Eagleton of St. Louis is a former U.S. senator from Missouri.