Putin collecting chips with weak hand

To paraphrase C.S. Lewis, who wrote of other fiends, there are two errors one can commit when considering Vladimir Putin: ignoring the essential nefariousness of his endeavors, or ascribing to him a strategic brilliance that has not been manifest in his foreign policy. The Obama administration believes the president of Russia wants what Westerners want: democracy, human rights, prosperity for his people and a respected place in the international community.

The nonsense of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's push for a "reset" of U.S.-Russian relations, complete with the embarrassment of an actual red button with that label, presupposed that Russia's brutality against its own people, alliances with dictatorships such as Syria, North Korea and Belarus, attempts to use natural gas supply lines to blackmail Europe, weapons deals with Iran, and bullying of its neighbors would suddenly go away if we pleaded for a "do-over."

This kind of naive silliness ignores the geopolitical reality of Russia. Every Russian ruler, whether Tsar, General Secretary, President or Prime Minister, will seek to dominate Eastern Europe as a buffer against invasion, to control warm water ports, to keep Western Europe divided, to repress non-Russian minorities, and counter any other nation, whether the UK (in the 19th century), Germany (in the first half of the 20th century) or the United States (since 1945) that rises to the level of a superpower. Putin and other Russian leaders do not expect to achieve final triumphs in any of these endeavors. Unlike many American politicians -- and, admittedly, large sections of the voting U.S. public -- Russians do not expect victory parades or the surrender of their enemies on the deck of a warship. Indeed, Russia measures a win by continuing to play, and to be considered a player, on whatever front they engage. In this sense, the ongoing low-level warfare in Ukraine, which pits Russian-backed separatists against the legitimate government of Kiev, represents a win for Putin because his enemy -- the Ukrainian government -- is unable to control its territory.

Similarly, Russia's intervention in Syria, launching airstrikes, ramping up weapons deliveries, and dispatching Spetsnaz special purpose forces to buttress the regime of Basher al Assad, is not calculated to achieve a victory for Damascus. Instead, Putin considers it a win if he is able to maintain dominant leverage over Assad, prevent ISIS or other rebels from conquering all of Syria, and ensuring that Russia will have a say in talks over Syria's future. Putin cares not at all for the human misery, ongoing death toll, and refugee crisis that his efforts are accelerating. Indeed, he must surely welcome the waves of refugees now flooding Europe, as a major factor in keeping the EU distracted from Russian deeds elsewhere.

However, as tempting as it is to believe that Putin is a master of foreign policy, one should not believe that he is more than a few steps before the United States. It is, after all, not a difficult thing to outthink and outmaneuver the Obama Administration in foreign affairs. While there have been some reasonable men and women serving President Obama -- most notably, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates -- this president has listened far too often to the 20-somethings on his national security staff, as well as far-left allies elsewhere in government. A consistent voice on foreign policy, Vice President Joe Biden, has also been, as Secretary Gates noted, consistently wrong on every major foreign policy issue over the past few decades.

Indeed, Putin merely has to follow the basic guidance that every effective ruler since Machiavelli has noted: support your allies, undermine your rivals, and seek to be feared, rather than loved, confident that these simple steps are likely to be fumbled by the Obama team. Russia is fundamentally a weak country, with an unfavorable geographic position, a fragile economy dependent on oil and natural gas exports, and powerful rivals on all sides: China to the East, militant Islam to the south, the European Union to its West, and the United States everywhere it cares to engage. Given this array, Russia is achieving remarkable successes.

Vladimir Putin knows, however, that these gains would be short-lived if it had to face a United States determined to do more to oppose Russia ambitions. Indeed, other than its nuclear weapons, and willingness to use force on its borders, Russian is actually not a Great Power. A realistic appraisal of global economic, military and cultural influence would even lead one to question whether Russia deserves a seat on the Security Council, or any major forum. The Russian economy teeters into depression with each fall in oil prices, its population declined for 20 straight years after the fall of the USSR, and it is crippled internally by corruption, violence, alcoholism, crime and drug use at rates among the highest in the world.

Putin, who in the last days of the Cold War spent his time frantically burning secret KGB files in East Germany, continues to view the United States as an enemy, responsible for what he views as the unfortunate collapse of the USSR. The next American president should understand that Russian ambitions -- to dominate its neighbors, to play on the world stage, to undermine the West at every step -- are only achievable if the U.S., through incompetence or as a matter of policy -- allows Russia these victories.