Saving Syria, saving Europe

Two major events in the Syrian Civil War have highlighted the abject failure of U.S. policies: the introduction of Russian combat power in support of the dictatorship of Bashar al Assad, and the humiliating collapse of U.S. efforts to train and equip Syrian rebels to fight both the Assad regime and the Islamic State.

Repeated missteps by the Obama Administration -- from reneging on threats of airstrikes against Assad's chemical weapons, to dithering for months while legitimate rebel forces were decimated by the Syrian military, to ignoring pleas from our Kurdish allies for heavy weapons -- have worsened the war, accelerating the flood of refugees to Europe. It seems now much less likely that the U.S. will be able to put in place any effective policy to end the Civil War, oust Assad, or create conditions for a peaceful transition -- goals publicly embraced the White House.

However, there is an approach that the U.S. and its European Union allies could take that could reverse the trajectory of the Syrian Civil War, as well as provide a partial solution for the refugee crisis that threatens to overwhelm Europe: send able-bodied Syrians back to liberate their nation.

Unlike U.S. efforts, which have relied on the ideological motivations of Syrian volunteers -- many of whom have immediately deserted to the Islamic State once across the border -- a new set of policies could increase the likelihood of success by tying the performance of soldiers in the units -- let's call them the Free Syrian Corps (FSC) -- to their opportunities for permanent status in Europe, or a fresh start in Syria.

Able-bodied Syrian men (and women, following the Kurdish examples) could volunteer for the FSC in Europe or in third countries with large refugee populations, such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. They would be trained, organized and equipped as light infantry, and provided with advisers from the U.S., EU and allied Arab states already engaged in the war against the Islamic State (IS). The incentives for loyalty to this force and courage in battle would be more than spiritual, however; any FSC volunteer who successfully completed a four-year tour, or who remained in service on the day when Assad and the IS met their final defeats, would be granted immediate permanent residency, along with up to four additional immediate family members, in a EU state of their choosing. Those without family members could sponsor other Syrians, either directly or indirectly, from among the orphans, widows and widowers unable to serve on their own behalf. As an alternative, these volunteers could opt to return to Syria after the war, with a $250,000 bounty, paid by the European Union, to restart their lives with their families.

There is precedent for exile armies; the British organized separate units of Jewish and Arab volunteers to fight against the Ottoman Empire in World War I. Both France and Spain organized foreign legions, granting citizenship to those who successfully completed tours of duty. The UK and U.S. during World War II supported exile movements from France and other nations. Indeed, General Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French movement, later became President of France.

The EU could still allow in a certain number of refugees: the young, the infirm, or highly skilled workers. The designated family members of those serving in the FSC would be given temporary status in Europe, pending the successful completion of their sponsor's military service.

Allied nations would commit to preparing these units for warfare, providing special forces, air support, and forward observers, as well as equipping more battle-tested units, such as Kurdish militias, with heavier weaponry necessary.

This policy has the potential to reduce the flow of refugees to Europe, as able-bodied male Syrians would enlist in the FSC, rather than being placed at the bottom of those eligible for permanent status in Europe. Nations that criticized this approach would be invited to identify the number of Syrian refugees they would be prepared to host on their own soil and with their own resources.

Providing incentives for Syrians to enlist in the FSC would enable the U.S. and EU to overcome failed attempts to organize rebel forces. Why would any Syrian today enlist in an exile army, faced with poor wages, inconsistent U.S. support, and the certainty of facing both the Islamic State and Assad's military? Many have already risked their lives to reach Europe. However, his would be an extension of these efforts, gaining sanctuary in Germany or Sweden not just for oneself, but for their families, by fighting the forces that drove them from their homes. As a final guarantee, FSC soldiers would be assured that, if they fell in battle, their families would receive the promised benefits.

This approach would show U.S. and EU leadership, perhaps contributing to a successful end to the Syrian Civil War as young Syrians rushed to enlist and serve with honor to save their families. It also has the potential to slow and reverse the flow of humanity to Europe, and give more secure futures to the millions who are now refugees or internally displaced by the Syrian Civil War. As a final benefit, the prospect of tens of thousands of new anti-Assad fighters joining the war could persuade Vladimir Putin that the time has come to offer the Syrian dictator a nice dacha in southern Russia as his new, and permanent, home.