Talking Turkey: the good and bad of Erdogan

The Republic of Turkey is the most powerful nation in the Middle East, with the largest economy, strongest armed forces and a population greater than that of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel combined.

While a member of NATO and host to two U.S. Air Force bases, relations with the U.S. have been strained over the last dozen years under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, prime minister from 2003 to 2014, when he was elected president of Turkey. Erdogan's time in office has seen unprecedented growth, rising living standards, dramatic advances in infrastructure, market reforms, and reductions in public debt, leading to upgrades of bond ratings to investment grade. Return visitors often note the better roads, enhanced rail service, and efficiencies throughout the economy.

While the global recession slowed growth and increased unemployment, the Turkish economic trajectory is one of the healthiest in the world. Erdogan has improved relations with Turkey's minority Kurds, who make up approximately 20 percent of the population of nearly 80 million. After decades of bans, Kurdish is now legal in Turkey, with Kurdish language television stations allowed in Kurdish-majority municipalities. While Kurdish political and cultural leaders still face restrictions, a new Kurdish-led political party -- the HDP -- is now the third largest political party in the Grand National Assembly, Turkey's parliament.

Indeed, despite his successes in the economy, the rise of the HDP in Turkey's most recent general election, held on June 7, reflected an increasing unhappiness with Erdogan. His party, the Islamist AKP (Justice and Welfare Party), lost its parliamentary majority, falling from 50 percent to 41 percent. The three other main parties -- the HDP, a moderate secular party (CHP), and a right-wing nationalist party (MHP) won a combined 60 percent. It was not a vote against Islam -- 99 percent of Turks are Muslim -- but against Erdogan's plans for a stronger presidency, corruption charges against many of his closest allies, and especially the sense that he believes himself to be above the law. His construction of a massive presidential palace in a nature preserve, defying multiple court orders, was one lavishly blatant example. His active campaigning for the AKP, despite a tradition that the president should stay above politics, appears to have also weighed on voters. State prosecutions for corruption and coup plotting have remarkably been concentrated on his political opponents, with cases against AKP leaders -- including Erdogan's son -- routinely dismissed by courts. The AKP has tightened censorship laws, again targeted almost exclusively against independent or anti-AKP media. Government security forces have banned many Internet sites, with Erdogan proposing that Facebook, YouTube and Twitter be banned -- fortunately, without success. Turkey's ranking by Freedom House as a nation with a media that is only "partly free" does reflect a situation showing the extent of the AKP's campaign.

Erdogan has raised concerns with his foreign policy, with seeming indifference toward the rise of the Islamic State. Indeed, recent press reports indicate he may be preparing to send the Turkish army into Syria, not to fight against IS, but to prevent Syrian Kurds from gaining any more territory on Turkey's frontier. The AKP has reversed what had been an alliance with Israel, advocating for the Palestinian cause and championing Hamas. Erdogan's regional ambitions were weakened by the ouster of Egypt's President Muhammad Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader that saw the AKP as an Islamist role model. Erdogan's closest remaining ally is Russia's Vladimir Putin; indeed, the two have often coordinated policies in opposition to the U.S. and the European Union. Recent trade deals and agreements for Russia to build nuclear power plants and oil pipelines demonstrate this partnership.

Despite the AKP's decline in the June elections, it remains the largest party and likely to rule in coalition. However, the grand vision of Erdogan has lost momentum with this electoral setback. Hopefully, he and his AKP allies will refocus on their party's original promises: to create a vibrant economy, end corruption and strengthen Turkey's role and image in the world. While continuing to embrace market reforms, the AKP should embrace freedom of ideas and of the press. As a movement that suffered censorship and outright bans on its activities, the AKP should recommit to freedoms for all Turkish citizens, whether Turks, Kurds, Greeks or Armenians. In its foreign policy, Turkey should focus on the enemy at its doorstep. Without supporting a Kurdish state, it could nonetheless join with other Muslim nations, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, in opposing the Islamic State.

If Erdogan can draw the correct lessons from his party's defeat, he may yet emerge with a positive legacy in Turkish history beyond roads and state finances. If he chooses to continue defying his own people, the AKP will soon look back with fondness to results of the June election, as their future will be one of additional electoral decline.

Wayne Bowen received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University, and is also an Army veteran. His is a professor and chair of the Department of History at Southeast Missouri State University.