Afghanistan: Lessons from the British Empire

In the 19th century, Central Asia was the scene of a struggle for dominance between the British and Russian Empires, a conflict that became known as "The Great Game."

Each of the major powers vied for tribal influence, military bases, trade agreements and cultural influence across a complex region of conflicting loyalties, warring ethnic groups and few resources.

Both empires expanded in the area, with the tsars consolidating control over territories bordering Russia, and the UK asserting itself over India and other adjacent areas. Unfortunately for the British, they also won control over most of Afghanistan -- the least coherent, least prosperous and least desirable of the lands in dispute.

As is often the case with empires, perhaps more than one official wondered why they had bothered to claim the place to begin with. The bitter resistance offered by the local populations in the three Anglo-Afghan Wars showed the limits on authority that the world's then-superpower faced.

Even so, the British maintained a nominal presence in Afghanistan to keep out Russian influence, maintain a northern buffer to their key colony of India and to constrain the Persians to the West.

The British continued to be frustrated by their Afghan clients, who for their part often chafed at the commercial and foreign policy restrictions imposed by the British embrace. It was, however, a mutual beneficial relationship that endured for decades.

The United States finds itself in an analogous situation in regards to Afghanistan.

There is no real conventional threat to the U.S. presence, but there is rising ambivalence in Kabul, as well as in the U.S., over the long-term strategic relationship, especially given the large -- although decreasing -- U.S. military profile.

Afghanistan is far more independent now than the British would have tolerated during their time as 19th century patrons of the Afghan monarchy, but the world also is a century removed from that earlier experience.

Additionally, while the British were concerned about Russian, Persian and even Ottoman influence in Afghanistan, there was little possibility of those foreign influences joining with indigenous forces to pose a threat to the British homeland.

Where the analogy does apply, providing a useful lesson to U.S. decision-makers, is in the size of the overall presence.

While fully prepared to dispatch major forces to defeat genuine threats to their Afghan allies, as many as 40,000 during the various uprisings -- the British did not permanently station tens of thousands, much less more than 100,000 -- soldiers in these lands, despite even greater logistical and transport challenges confronting them.

For all of its might and technology, the British defeated Afghan rebels three times, in each case without the benefit of aircraft, armored vehicles, radios or computer networks.

The light footprint of a British presence -- in some cases fewer than 1,000 diplomats and soldiers -- came with risks, but fewer than when the profile was much larger.

The 1842 massacre of an entire British force of 15,000, except for one survivor, illustrated the dangers of direct occupation. Instead, the most successful periods were when no Union Jacks flew in Kabul, except over one embassy, but the Afghan government agreed to follow British guidance on trade and foreign policy questions in exchange for protection from other external powers.

Afghanistan is an independent state, and the relationship with the U.S. is one of partnership, rather than subordination, unlike under the 19th century Anglo-Afghan terms. However, both Afghanistan and the U.S. would benefit from an accelerated move to a final security agreement.

A modest and low-profile presence -- perhaps one brigade of 5,000 U.S. military personnel -- and a continued robust diplomatic mission would provide sufficient strength. This level of forces would reduce U.S. casualties and costs, while retaining our ability to train Afghan forces, which already are bearing the brunt of all combat operations.

The U.S. could move to this profile within 18 to 24 months, completing a status of forces agreement at the same time to assure the Afghans the West intends to stay as allies, if on smaller scale.

This size of force would be large enough to defend itself against any potential conventional or terrorist threats, without having such a large profile it would continue to be significant as a rallying point for anti-American forces.

With one or two modest-sized bases as part of this presence, we also would be able to provide security and infrastructure for NATO and non-NATO allies who want to continue to assist the Afghans, but do not have the capacity to provision and defend their own bases.

Finally, maintaining an operational force of this size would, in a paraphrase of a more famous line spoken about NATO, "keep the Russians out, the Europeans in and the Taliban down," goals also entirely consistent with the objectives of the Afghan government.

Wayne Bowen, a U.S. Army veteran, received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University. He resides in Cape Girardeau.