Israel is a safe country, with crime rates lower than the U.S., most of Europe and East Asia. The daily safety of its citizens is even starker when compared to Africa, Latin America and most of its neighbors in the Middle East. Indeed, it is far more dangerous for the average American tourist to visit a major U.S. city -- such as Chicago or Miami -- than to vacation in Israel. By many other measures -- life expectancy, medical care, educational attainment, social justice, even overall happiness -- Israelis enjoy not just a higher standard of living, but a greater sense of satisfaction with their lives than citizens of the United States and most other developed nations. Indeed, for these reasons Israel continues to welcome 15,000-20,000 new citizens every year, with France and Russia, witnessing rising anti-Semitism, as major European contributors of immigrants.

While Israelis do live more happily and successfully on a daily basis, they face existential threats -- that is, dangers that could destroy their society -- on a level nearly unimaginable for those who have not seen these circumstances directly. Having recently returned from my second visit to Israel, I can attest to the proximity of multiple threats to Israel, as well as the long-term risks ahead for this New Jersey-sized nation.

During the Cold War, the U.S. faced the possibility of nuclear conflict with the USSR, for good reason described as "Mutual Assured Destruction." Israel does not face a single enemy in this way, instead confronting several.

The greatest risk to Israel is a nuclear-armed Iran. Current negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 nations (the U.S., UK, Russia, China, France and Germany) seem headed toward an agreement that might delay, but certainly will not cripple, Iran's ambitions in this regard. Key Iranian leaders past and present have vowed to destroy Israel, and some share an apocalyptic view that would welcome the kind of devastation that only nuclear weapons could bring. While the Obama Administration has embraced negotiations with Iran, it has been repeatedly warned not only by Israel, but by other regional allies such as Saudi Arabia, that Iran is not to be trusted. Even the weak International Atomic Energy Agency, often accused of turning a blind eye to nuclear programs, has denounced Iran's repeated violations.

The Islamic State is another serious threat to Israel's national security. Now in control of perhaps half of Syria, if IS emerges the winner in the Syrian Civil War it will control the border with Israel. It now seems fortuitous that Israel never surrendered the Golan Heights, a demand made repeatedly by Syrian governments since Israel occupied these highlands in 1967. The Golan Heights overlook much of northern Israel; it takes little imagination to see what IS could do with this terrain: launching missile and rocket attacks, sending terrorist infiltrators into Israel, and threatening Israeli farms, towns, and cities from the Sea of Galilee to the Lebanese Border. Even with the Golan Heights still in Israeli hands, as hopefully will be their long-term status, a shared border with the Islamic State would make past conflicts on Israel's frontiers seem like a normal day along the U.S.-Canadian line.

Finally, Israel faces the potential for a resurgent Intifada -- a Palestinian uprising -- as occurred twice previously (1987-1993 and 2000-2005), supported by outside forces. Israeli security forces repressed these prior rebellions, which in any case were not universally supported by Palestinians. However, one can imagine a nightmare scenario: an intifada on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, joined by Arab Israelis, approximately 20 percent of the population. While many Arab Israelis, especially Druse, Bedouins and Christians, oppose the Islamist vision of Hamas and the IS, a recent riot in the city of Kafr Kanna (the Biblical city of Cana, where Jesus turned water into wine) over the killing of a young Arab who attacked Israeli police show the potential for these circumstances to explode. Driving past this demonstration, I noted how outnumbered Israeli police were by Arab crowds, emblematic of the demographic of the broader region.

In the near horizon, 3 to 5 years, Israel dominates the region, faces no immediate conventional or unconventional hazards beyond its capacity, and can likely mitigate these three existential threats. Beyond that time, however, the regional calculus becomes much more challenging. Israel cannot count on moderate regimes, such as anti-Islamist government of Egypt's President Sisi and Jordan's King Abdullah, to play a perpetual role as allies.

What then is the solution to preserve Israel as a prosperous and successful state, maintaining its security and Jewish identity? Most Israelis realize that the time to negotiate with the Palestinians is now, understanding that any deal will involve territorial swaps (contiguous Jewish settlements on the West Bank exchanged for heavily Arab border regions), divided sovereignty over Jerusalem, and some ability for Palestinian refugees to return or receive compensation for property lost or abandoned in 1967.

Threats from Iran and the Islamic State actually provide a unique opportunity for Israel. Arab nations such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan are now more focused on these dangers than on undermining the Jewish state. Indeed, there have even been public calls in some Arab states for even more accommodation with Israel to enable full attention to the IS and Iran. Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu could take the initiative with an opening bid, simultaneous with early parliamentary elections to gain a mandate for negotiations. With Israel at its strongest in relation to the Palestinians, a final agreement made in this context would be more favorable for Israel that it would have been had past opportunities come to fruition.

Wayne Bowen, a U.S. Army veteran, received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University. He resides in Cape Girardeau.