ISOLATIONISM AND OUR NATIONAL INTEREST

It's our magical formula in international affairs: The United States acts "when it's in our national interest." If evolving developments in Situation A are clearly in "our national interest," we pay close attention and, depending on events, might even contemplate taking some military action "in our national interest."

If evolving developments in Situation B are clearly outside of "our national interest," we benignly sit back and watch, comforted in knowing that, whatever happens, it will have no geopolitical impact on our country.

It's easy: Simply apply the "national interest" test and foreign policy can be put on automatic pilot.

Trouble is, no one has concocted a workable definition of "our national interest." It's all in the eye of the beholder.

In the Cold War era, an expansionist definition was applied. To Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, "our national interest" was to see to it that the Communists didn't grab further chunks of the globe. To Dulles, the whole world was "our national interest" as we tried to "contain Communism."

Since over time the Soviets and the PRC, nasty as they were, by and large territorially contained themselves, the Dulles definition operated -- albeit imperfectly -- for four decades. The players were identified; the rules were established; the game was set. NATO was our primary national interest. Half of our defense budget was directed to the defense of Western Europe.

Korea and Cuba were national interests. Vietnam became a national interest. So, too, Cambodia and Laos. Lebanon, Grenada, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Chile, Israel, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf States were all national interests.

The "us vs. them" formulation of foreign policy -- so menacing, yet definitionally simplistic -- came to an end with the demise of Communism. The seemingly easy formulation of "our national interest" evaporated and the "new world order" concept or "national interest" became maddeningly blurred.

At times, "national interest" seems every where, yet it is no where. George Bush found it to exist in the Persian Gulf. Oil was in our national interest. Colin Powell wasn't so sure, but he would go along if the use of American forces was so massive as to assure quick and positive results. The Powell corollary to national interest was if you decide to move militarily, don't seek "adequacy," but go with "overwhelming strength."

As a lame duck president, Bush found the feeding of starving Somalis to be "in America's interest." This broadened the definition. No longer was "national security" or, as in oil, "economic security" the guiding precept. Humanitarian concerns -- misery and hunger -- were deemed to be worth fighting for. We must remember there's a lot of misery and hunger around the globe -- much of it in destabilized political arenas. In deciding what's in our national interest, the misery spots of the world can't be determined by the whim of where television networks send their film crews.

The armed services are keenly interested -- given adequate military might -- in being part of humanitarian endeavors. It gives the services, in part, a mission to perform and a budget rationale in the post Cold War World. However, the American people seem ill disposed to humanitarian endeavors if there is any substantial risk of loss of life of U.S. servicemen.

It took 58,000 dead in Vietnam to finally exhaust our tolerance for blood in that prolonged engagement. It took only 18 dead on one Sunday to exhaust our tolerance in Somalia. In Haiti, it took only the hint of blood in a dockside demonstration of a couple of hundred thugs to turn around our ship.

In Congress, some of the old hawks have become born again doves. Senator Robert Dole, the Republican leader, was one of the fiercest critics of the War Powers Act, the mostly ignored post-Vietnam legislative effort to share the war-making power between the president, as Commander in Chief, and the Congress.

Dole cheered when Presidents Reagan and Bush said they would ignore that law. These presidents said they reserved the right to send American troops where ever and whenever they determined, whether Congress liked it or not. Indeed, Bush stated we would send his armada to the Persian Gulf even if the Congress voted to disapprove. Now Dole wants to constrict President Clinton's Commander-in-Chief authority. Consistency is not essential in the high art of Congressional politics.

But there's more involved than the quixotic behavior of some members of Congress. The October Sunday in Somalia has touched a dormant, but deep undercurrent of isolationism in the American psyche. Except for this hemisphere and except for the Cold War, our political experience from George Washington's Farewell Address has been one of trying to separate ourselves from the torment and troubles of the rest of the world. We truly want no foreign entanglements.

The Red Menace caused us to rethink our obligations after World War II. The Red Menace is gone and America is reverting to its roots. "Our national interest" is taking on a narrower scope. At the very time that we are seeking a greater global presence economically, we are narrowing our global presence politically. It's in our blood. It's part of our history.